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 Preparing for peace: An analysis 
of Darfur, Sudan
Margie Buchanan-Smith and Brendan Bromwich
Narratives that attempt to explain the confl ict in Darfur  primarily as a natural 
resource–based confl ict are simplistic and misleading. Although competition over 
access to land and other natural resources is a major fault line at the local level, 
the confl ict has to be understood in terms of wider political agendas that have 
manipulated those local tensions in the absence of a functional system of govern-
ance. This chapter argues for a three-level analysis of the confl ict: local, national, 
and regional (incorporating neighboring countries).
There have been various attempts to resolve the decade-long confl ict, but 
none has yet been successful. Darfur has thus become the scene of a protracted 
crisis in which the confl ict dynamics have become entrenched, as have some of 
the negative long-term impacts, such as those on the environment and livelihoods. 
Should one wait until there is a peace agreement before addressing issues of 
natural resource management and before attempting to reverse environmental 
degradation? This chapter argues that doing so would be disastrous, and that 
humanitarian programming to meet immediate emergencies can be extended 
to address some of these longer-term issues and thereby help put in place the 
foundations for sustainable and peaceful natural resource management in Darfur 
in the future.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the complexity of the Darfur confl ict, 
arguing that it cannot be reduced to a single theory of competition over natural 
resources. It then introduces a livelihoods framework to explain the connections 
between the confl ict, environmental degradation, and livelihoods. The next 
section explains how long-term processes of environmental degradation have 
accelerated and are associated with rapid and distorted processes of urbanization 
and the struggle for livelihoods in a contracting economy. The following section 
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reveals the limitations of the international humanitarian effort so far in engaging 
with, and attempting to reverse, some of these devastating trends. The chapter 
then refl ects on attempts at building peace in Darfur and draws out some of the 
lessons for future peacebuilding efforts, arguing that until there is resolution to 
the confl ict a dual approach to humanitarianism is necessary—an approach that 
responds simultaneously to short-term needs and engages with longer-term transi-
tions. The chapter concludes by summarizing how the lessons learned from Darfur 
are relevant to other confl icts and peacebuilding efforts.
DARFUR: A COMPLEX PROBLEM
The environment of the vast region of Darfur is Sahelian—semi-arid on the 
southern fringes of the Sahara Desert.1 Although this environment appears harsh 
and inhospitable, Darfuri livelihoods of pastoralism and agro-pastoralism had 
adapted remarkably well to these conditions for centuries. During the twentieth 
century, however, Darfur’s fragile balance of the environment and livelihoods 
was challenged by a number of changes. First, expansion of cultivation posed a 
direct threat to pastoralist migration routes in a region where land rights were 
unevenly distributed and hotly contested (Tubiana 2007). Second, there was 
a weakening of natural resource governance to address these issues and the 
resulting competition for access to natural resources between various ethnic 
and livelihood groups at the local level (Morton 1994; Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, 
and Yousuf 2007). Third, although the state of Sudan experienced unprecedented 
wealth since the discovery of oil in the latter part of the twentieth century, this 
wealth has been unevenly distributed and has not broken the pattern of under-
investment in and marginalization of Darfur (and other peripheral areas of Sudan) 
that dates back to colonial times. The consequences have been very low rates of 
economic growth and development in Darfur since at least the 1980s, forcing 
the growing population to remain heavily dependent on rural livelihoods and to 
compete for the natural resource base.
These harsh facts about Darfur make it clear that any one-dimensional 
explanation of the current confl ict is inadequate. For example, much of the debate 
over the role of the environment in the Darfur confl ict has been unhelpfully 
simplistic. At worst, it has been portrayed as a Malthusian narrative of an increasing 
population facing an encroaching desert without reference to issues of governance 
or to the wider political dimensions of the confl ict. While it is tempting to point 
out that sixteen of the twenty driest years on record in El Fasher (the capital of 
North Darfur State) have occurred since 1972 (Tearfund 2007a), the fact that the 
1 In Darfur, the far northern area where rainfall is less than 50 millimeters (mm) per year is 
uninhabited. Toward central Darfur, rainfall increases to 200 to 500 mm. The mountains 
of Jebel Marra in the western central region of Darfur break this pattern with rainfall 
up to 800 mm (and elevation up to 3,000 meters). Farther south, the population density 
increases, and the rainfall per year reaches approximately 800 mm.
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current confl ict has taken place in years of above-average rainfall in Darfur has 
been conveniently overlooked2 (Bromwich 2009). This simplistic environmental 
narrative also makes it diffi cult to explain why the fi ghting has reached N’Djamena 
in Chad and Omdurman in central Sudan. Instead, a full understanding of the 
confl ict must take into account the complexity and interconnectedness of the 
different factors and agendas at play.
A more sophisticated analysis of the complexity of the confl ict acknowledges 
the overarching political dimension and how access to natural resources has been 
manipulated at the local level as part of that broader political struggle (de Waal 
2007). One approach to explain the complexity is to consider three different 
2 See, for example, Kevane and Gray (2008). 
Notes:
A – The Hala’ib Triangle, claimed by Sudan and de facto administered by Egypt.
B – The disputed Abyei area; shaded area depicts the Abyei area as proposed by the government of Sudan.
C – The Ilemi Triangle, claimed by Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Kenya and de facto controlled by Kenya.
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levels of the confl ict: local, national, and regional (Young et al. 2005). At the 
local level, the confl ict is taking place between different ethnic groups or groups 
with different livelihood strategies, each competing for power and access to 
natural resources. At the national level, the confl ict is between Darfuri rebel 
groups and the political leadership of the federal government in Khartoum. This 
level reveals long-term inequalities between the center and the periphery, and 
the concentration of polit ical power by ruling elites in the center.3 At the wider 
regional level, the confl ict involves Sudan’s neighboring countries, especially 
Chad. Struggles for political power in Khartoum and in N’Djamena are closely 
intertwined, with the respective governments of Sudan and Chad frequently sup-
porting rebel movements in the other country.4
How these three levels interact is critical to understanding current events 
in Darfur and the role of natural resources in the confl ict dynamics. Competition 
between different ethnic and livelihood groups over natural resources, and espe-
cially land, has long been a source of tension in Darfur. In the current confl ict, 
this has become a major fault line at the local level, exploited by political agendas 
at the national and regional levels. For example, the Khartoum government has 
exploited the land issue by manipulating the long-term grievances of ethnic 
groups without their own dar, or tribal land (Tubiana 2007).5
UNDERSTANDING DARFUR: THE ADAPTED LIVELIHOODS 
FRAMEWORK
This chapter employs the adapted livelihoods framework to explain how the 
confl ict in Darfur has exacerbated environmental degradation and what this 
means for humanitarian programming and for peacebuilding. The key implication 
of the framework is that humanitarian programming, which is initially aimed at 
immediate life-threatening crises, can be linked to long-term programming that 
supports livelihood development and peacebuilding.
The adapted livelihoods framework illustrated in fi gure 1 provides an analytical 
tool for understanding how natural resource management is inextricably linked to 
confl ict dynamics (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006).6 One of the most important 
3 According to Alex de Waal, this was also a major factor in the long-running civil war 
between northern and southern Sudan, prior to South Sudan’s secession (de Waal 2007).
4 The Central African Republic and Libya have also been involved in the confl ict. The 
regional dynamics are particularly clear when the political analysis is extended back to 
the 1960s. See, for example, Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti (2009) and Marchal (2007).
5 This is how the northern Rizeygat, without their own dar, came to supply much of the 
Janjaweed militia in the early years of the confl ict (Young et al. 2009).
6 This framework was adapted by Tufts University for complex humanitarian emergen-
cies. It has been effectively applied during the confl ict in Darfur in a series of workshops 
designed to sharpen the strategic focus of livelihoods programming during the crisis 
(Young et al. 2007). Not only did this version of the livelihoods framework facilitate 
communication and contributions across disciplines, it also provided a neutral vehicle 
for discussing the impacts of sensitive political issues, for example, the militarization 
of pastoralist youth as a livelihood strategy.
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contributions of the framework is the distinction between assets and policies, 
institutions, and processes (PIPs), as well as the connection between them.
Assets fall into one of the following six categories: (1) natural (for example, 
water and pasture); (2) physical (capital used for production, such as livestock and 
agricultural tools); (3) human (the capability of household members); (4) fi nancial 
(measures of wealth); (5) social (social capital, including networks of reciprocal 
social obligations); and (6) political (meaning political capital). While assets 
infl uence the strategies that households are able to pursue, they are also infl uenced 
by prevailing PIPs. For example, taxation policy will affect the return a household 
receives from selling some of its produce. In a confl ict setting, whether the 
institution of the market is functioning, which is at least partially dependent on 
confl ict processes, will also infl uence how the household uses its assets. Thus 
the feedback loop helps to understand how the PIPs infl uence access to assets, 
and also the fi nal value or quality of assets (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006).
This distinction—between assets and PIPs—encourages a more accurate 
analysis of the impacts of the confl ict on livelihoods and the environment, a 
better understanding of peoples’ choices of livelihood strategies, and a framework 
for designing more appropriate programs. Sue Lautze and Angela Raven-Roberts 
explain that “the utility of assets is mediated through the governance environment 
of the many layers of different societies’ formal and informal policies, institutions 
and processes” (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006, 393).
Assets, especially physical assets, tend to receive more attention in humani-
tarian programming than PIPs, although it may be the PIPs that are the critical 
factor affecting a household’s ability to use its assets. For example, in Darfur, 
an ethnic group with its own dar may have a clear sense of the geographical 
demarcation of its natural resource base (such as grazing and water resources). 
Sharing of those natural resources within the group is mediated through the tribal 
leaders, who also play a key role in negotiating access by other ethnic and liveli-
hood groups to grazing and water resources. Whether such negotiations will 
prove to be secure, however, depends on two factors: fi rst, whether the negoti-
ations are formally recognized by the wider policy framework that governs natural 
resource management within Sudan; second, whether the negotiations can avoid 
being severely disrupted by violence—when, for example, a competing ethnic 
Figure 1. Adapted livelihoods framework for complex humanitarian emergencies
Source: Adapted from Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006).
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group tries to force access to key grazing resources through the power of the 
gun. Thus, confl ict between different livelihood groups is also captured by the 
PIPs box in fi gure 1.
An important contribution of the adapted livelihoods framework is how 
it posits that some forms of vulnerability within the livelihood system are 
endogenous—that livelihood assets may also be liabilities.7 For example, in Darfur, 
ownership of cattle, a valuable asset, can expose an individual or household to 
increased risk of attack or looting. Similarly, violent confl ict should not be viewed 
as being external to PIPs, but is better understood in terms of its various forms: 
violence as process; violence as institution; and violence as policy. An example 
of violence as policy was the government of Sudan’s counterinsurgency strategy 
in response to the 2003 Darfur rebellion.
PROCESSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION DURING 
THE DARFUR CONFLICT, 2003–2009
The onset of the Darfur confl ict had two disastrous effects on the region, both 
of which have long-term implications and will only be solved by long-term 
planning. First, the confl ict destroyed the last vestiges of effective natural resource 
management, which had eroded in previous decades as a result of weakening 
local governance. Second, the violence has caused massive population displace-
ment and unprecedented migration to cities, severely straining the environment 
around the urban areas.
Erosion of natural resource management in Darfur
Historically, natural resource management in Darfur was rooted in traditional 
leadership structures, originating in the Fur Sultanate that ruled western Darfur 
until the late nineteenth century. These structures were codifi ed in the colonial 
era (beginning in 1916) as a system of native administration. According to Musa 
Abdul-Jalil, Adam Mohammed, and Ahmed Yousuf, “For more than half a century 
the native administration provided a system of local governance that managed 
the use of natural resources and allowed various groups to live in relative peace 
and stability” (Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf 2007). Traditional leaders 
were primarily responsible for maintaining law and order within their particular 
identity or ethnic group. In addition to settling disputes, they were also responsible 
for protecting the environment upon which livelihoods depended.
For the last fi fty years, however, the story in Darfur has been very different. 
Local governance has been in a constant state of fl ux. For short periods, 
the native administration, a key part of local governance, has been disbanded 
completely—for example, in 1971 under President Gaafar Nimeiry—and then 
7 This is one of the key distinctions between the adapted livelihoods framework used in 
this chapter and the sustainable livelihoods framework used in development contexts; 
the latter framework tends to regard vulnerability as exogenous to the livelihood system.
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reinstated. Over longer periods, the native administration has become heavily 
politicized, usually serving the interests of the central government rather than 
the interests of local communities. Administrative boundaries have been redrawn 
a number of times, most controversially in 1995 when Darfur was divided into 
three states. This move, which split the Fur heartland among the three states, 
was contested by many Darfuris, who perceived it as weakening the social 
integrity of the region. As a consequence of these trends, there has been a gradual 
weakening of both traditional leadership structures and of formal local governance 
structures. This, in turn, has degraded the mechanisms and processes for sustain-
able and equitable management of natural resources (Curtis and Scoones 1990).
The violent confl ict in Darfur since 2003 has sounded the death knell for 
functioning environmental governance. At the local level, the confl ict has been 
fought along ethnic lines (partly relating to different livelihood groups), heavily 
manipulated by counterinsurgency tactics employed by the central government 
in Khartoum. The counterinsurgency tactics have involved the arming of certain 
groups—for example, the northern Rizeygat, who have particular grievances about 
their lack of tribal land rights and who have been closely associated with the 
notorious Janjaweed militia. As the social fabric of Darfur has been torn apart, 
the impact on natural resource management in most parts of the region has been 
devastating. Control over natural resources is now determined more by the gun 
than by policy, government institutions, or negotiated agreements. This is evident 
in areas such as Kabkabiya, a district of North Darfur State, and in parts of West 
Darfur State and South Darfur State, where armed pastoralist groups have become 
de facto custodians of the bush. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), urban and rural 
residents, and traders––to ensure their protection when traveling to collect fi rewood
––must pay these armed groups (UNEP 2008a). This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the national government has a very limited presence outside most of the main 
government-held towns in Darfur. For example, the Forestry National Corporation 
(FNC), the main national government agency responsible for setting and imple-
menting policy related to the production, management, and trade of timber, has lost 
access to large swaths of rural Darfur, including its own plantations and reserves.
Not surprisingly, the incidence of confl ict over natural resources increased 
as local governance deteriorated. Although it is tempting to describe the increase 
in violence in Malthusian terms—increasing competition over natural resources 
as Darfur’s population grew against the backdrop of the increasing frequency of 
drought—this explanation is too simplistic; the failure of governance and the 
weakening of local institutions have been key factors.
Accelerated urbanization and economic contraction: 
Effect on the environment
As natural resource management has broken down, Darfur’s human geography 
has also changed irrevocably during a decade of confl ict. One of the most 
dramatic consequences of the confl ict has been the accelerated and distorted 
process of urbanization affecting all major towns (Buchanan-Smith and McElhinney 
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2011). This process is principally a result of the massive displacement and 
upheaval that has been a feature of the confl ict from the beginning, affecting 
some 2 million people. Large camps with up to 70,000 IDPs abut many of Darfur’s 
towns, in addition to the displaced people that live with relatives or independently 
inside the towns. The additional presence of the international community (aid 
organizations and thousands of peacekeepers) has swollen the town populations 
further. Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State, grew approximately 2.5 times 
in size since the confl ict began in 2003 to approximately 1.3 million people 
(including IDPs) in 2008, becoming Sudan’s third largest urban center.8 The evi-
dence from other areas in Sudan (including areas that are now in South Sudan)—
including Khartoum, Juba, and other towns in southern Sudan9—illustrates how 
large-scale confl ict-related displacement can soon produce long-term unplanned 
urban settlements, even after peace is restored (Pantuliano et al. 2008).
At the same time, there has been a substantial contraction of Darfur’s 
economy. Many rural livelihoods have collapsed as entire villages have been 
abandoned and as pastoralists are no longer able to follow migration routes to 
critical grazing areas (Young et al. 2009). Trade in all of Darfur’s main agricul-
tural and livestock products has been badly affected as production has declined 
and trade routes have closed or become highly insecure, causing transport and 
transaction costs to soar (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul 2008). As a consequence, 
growing numbers of people have been turning to the unsustainable exploitation 
of natural resources as the source of their livelihoods. What used to be a coping 
strategy for rural households in times of stress—collecting and selling fi rewood 
during drought years—has become a means of adaptation for almost all groups, from 
displaced farmers to pastoralists. The United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) reported that even traders who used to buy and sell other commodities 
have become traders of timber, fi rewood, and charcoal (UNEP 2008a).
The negative impacts of these unsustainable coping strategies have been 
magnifi ed by the construction boom that has accompanied the accelerated urban-
ization of Darfur. Between 2003 and 2008, urban rents increased between four times 
(in Nyala) and sixteen times (in Zalingei), fuelled by the unprecedented presence 
of the international community (UNEP 2008a). Investment in property has become 
one of the most secure forms of capital, with potentially high returns in an otherwise 
contracting economy. Brick making has increased to four or fi ve times the pre-
confl ict level, and fuel for kilns (often greenwood) has become the most signifi cant 
driver of deforestation, followed by timber for construction. The increasing 
distances that IDPs and urban residents have to travel to fi nd fi rewood, whether 
for cooking or for sale, are alarming. For example, IDPs from Kalma camp 
outside Nyala once travelled about 15 kilometers to collect fi rewood; by 2008, 
8 In the 2008 census, Nyala’s population was set at 750,000. But there were many prob-
lems with the census in Darfur, and the Ministry of Urban Planning estimated the city’s 
population of Nyala to be closer to 1.3 million (Buchanan-Smith and McElhinney 2011).
9 In this chapter, southern Sudan refers to the southern area of Sudan, prior to the seces-
sion of South Sudan.
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they had to travel up to 75 kilometers. In North Darfur State, the situation had 
become even more critical: in 2008 IDPs reported travelling up to a week to 
collect a donkey cart load of fi rewood fuel. The confl ict has also infl icted severe 
damage on the forest reserves managed by the FNC, which has very limited 
ability to access areas outside Darfur’s main towns. In West Darfur State, the 
FNC reported in 2008 that fi ve of their reserves had lost their entire tree cover 
and another two had lost 50 percent of their tree cover.
The rapid process of urbanization has also placed unprecedented stress on 
water resources in urban areas, most notably in Nyala and in El Fasher, two 
towns with limited aquifers and poor water resources.10  One IDP camp on the 
edge of Nyala experienced a drop in groundwater levels of approximately seven 
meters over an eighteen-month period and is one of two camps that now need 
piped supplies following exhaustion of the aquifer. Studies undertaken by UNEP, 
building on work by Tearfund, identifi ed twenty-three IDP camps across Darfur 
potentially at risk from groundwater depletion, representing what was approxi-
mately 40 percent of the IDP population at the time (UNEP 2008b; Tearfund 2007b).
Darfur’s vulnerability to drought has escalated in the confl ict years, not 
just because of the unplanned and unprecedented demand for resources, but 
also because drought has occurred as structures of government have weakened 
or become nonexistent and the mobility of people and livestock has become 
limited. At its peak, the large-scale food aid operation in response to the 
confl ict provided Darfur with an unprecedented safety net that could alleviate 
the impact of a severe drought year, as experienced in 2009. By 2014, however, 
food aid levels were declining and this safety net had weakened. At the same 
time, limited mobility and heavy concentrations of people and livestock have 
put much greater pressure on water and grazing resources than in pre-confl ict 
drought years.
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
As the extent of the violence and displacement in Darfur became apparent in 
2003 and 2004, international humanitarian aid agencies mobilized assistance 
on a massive scale. Darfur became the recipient of the world’s largest food 
aid operation, run by the World Food Programme. Initially, the focus was on 
immediate life-saving needs, particularly in response to the rapid and large-scale 
displacement. By the end of 2004, the emergency aid program was more or less 
in place, involving hundreds of organizations. It is to the credit of the international 
humanitarian community and many local organizations that the provision of 
water, sanitation, and health services to IDP camps and some rural areas helped 
to contain some aspects of Darfur’s humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the provision 
10 Like many of the more populated areas of central Darfur, these cities lie on basement 
complex geology. This geology includes rocks such as schists, gneisses, and granites, 
which have little potential for storing water. Other towns, such as Geneina, lie on 
more water-rich sandstone (Tearfund 2007b).
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of food aid contained malnutrition and worked as an income transfer for a number 
of years, although food aid levels have since declined.11
The thinking and approaches that characterized the beginning of the relief 
operation, however, have persisted. Although some humanitarian organizations 
began in 2005 to consider how they could go beyond emergency relief to support 
livelihoods even as the humanitarian crisis continued, it would be another two 
years before these kinds of interventions attracted widespread interest, funding, 
and programming.12
Almost a decade into the confl ict the international effort was still focused 
on meeting immediate needs through the provision of relief items, usually physi-
cal assets. It has been less successful in addressing the broader challenges. For 
example, Darfur abstracted unprecedented amounts of groundwater water for 
its vast new centers of populations, but for the fi rst three years there was no 
monitoring of the impact on aquifers. Fortunately, Darfur has enjoyed several 
years of good rainfall since the confl ict began, but recurrent drought is a fact of 
life for this Sahelian region, and the rains in 2009 were poor in North Darfur 
State. Few agencies had built any kind of drought preparedness protocol into 
their human itarian and relief plans, and thus in 2009 they had to monitor the 
situation and adapt their responses in real time rather than in advance.13
International agencies have built thousands of new shelters, latrines, and 
other buildings in IDP camps. But much of it has been done without consider-
ing the impacts on the environment from the heavily infl ated demand for timber, 
and in the absence of a functioning system for managing natural resources. 
Environmental assessments have been absent from camp management strategies. 
Despite the pioneering work in developing international best practices in com-
munity environmental action plans (CEAPs) for refugee camp management in 
eastern Sudan, the fi rst systematic attempt to promote CEAPs in Darfur did not 
start until seven years into the confl ict. Above all, there has been remarkably 
little engagement in addressing Darfur’s settlement patterns, which are changing 
with the rapid and unplanned process of urbanization.14
11 An income transfer, in this context, means that the food aid is sold by the household 
for much-needed cash.
12 Growing interest in livelihoods programming was evident in the series of workshops 
facilitated by Tufts University in Darfur in July 2007, which brought together more 
than 180 local and international actors from local government, civil society, and inter-
national agencies (Young et al. 2007). For a fi rst-hand perspective on the importance 
of humanitarian assistance extending to longer-term livelihood provision, see Egeland 
(2015).
13 In 2008, UNEP published “Water Resource Management in Humanitarian Programming 
in Darfur: The Case for Drought Preparedness” in an effort to avoid such an oversight 
(UNEP 2008b).
14 The Chinese government has been most engaged with the Darfur Regional Authority 
(previously, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority) in addressing the major works 
that are required due to urbanization. Other organizations have been much slower to 
address the urbanization process.
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Why have international humanitarian aid organizations failed to engage with 
these critical trends (many of which would be within the PIPs box in fi gure 1) 
and to target their responses to the wider context within which they are operating? 
The reasons are not unique to Darfur and can best be explained by examining 
the prevailing humanitarian paradigm.
First, planning and implementing humanitarian programs are strongly 
needs oriented, designed to provide physical assets to those most affected by the 
crisis by replacing the assets they have lost (for example, the distribution of 
food aid and of nonfood items). Much less attention is paid to the PIPs that 
may have caused the loss of assets, or that may be affected by how relief 
is provided and the emergency is contained. Little attention has been paid, in 
Darfur, to the deforestation and environmental degradation processes that have 
accelerated around the main towns and the reasons for it, which include a 
construction boom fueled by the presence of the international community and 
the breakdown of institutions and systems for managing natural resources. A 
predominantly needs-oriented approach has also meant that assessments focus 
almost entirely on demand, such as demand for water within IDP camps, and 
on how to meet international humanitarian standards, such as standards set by 
the Sphere Project,15 without paying suffi cient attention to whether there are 
suffi cient water resources to meet that demand year after year while the confl ict 
continues.
Second, even in chronic crises, the planning and funding horizons for 
humanitarian action are short-term, rarely more than a year, and there is little 
strategic planning. The multilateral Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan, 
for example, operates on a one-year time frame, as does the U.S. Agency for 
International Development’s Offi ce of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. The 
European Community Humanitarian Aid Offi ce––now the Directorate-General 
for Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission—once used the same timeline 
but extended its funding timescale for Darfur to eighteen months in the mid-2000s 
(Collinson, Buchanan-Smith, and Elhawary 2009). These short time frames are 
a disincentive to identify and monitor longer trends related to PIPs—such as the 
unplanned process of urbanization, or the impact of IDP camps and numerous 
new boreholes on water sources—and to respond to them with long-term policy 
solutions.
Third, most of the frontline humanitarian work is carried out by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) operating within defi ned geographic areas. 
In a context as logistically and politically challenging as Darfur’s, this has 
been a pragmatic response, but it can result in a fragmented and disaggregated 
approach to planning and programming that tends to focus on assets and fails to 
engage with long-term processes and trends. The role of UN agencies is critical 
in providing the strategic overview as well as practical coordination. This should 
15 The Sphere Project recommends a minimum of fi fteen liters of water per person per 
day to meet basic water needs (Sphere Project 2011).
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have happened in Darfur through the UN Work Plan (to which many NGOs 
subscribe) and the Common Humanitarian Fund. But in practice, the potential 
to analyze and maintain a perspective on the bigger picture and to develop a 
long-term strategy has been slow to be realized, and the Common Humanitarian 
Fund has tended to be a gap-fi lling mechanism (Willitts-King, Mowjee, and 
Barham 2007).16
Fourth, some key areas of technical expertise are weak or missing in the 
international humanitarian community’s repertoire of skills, militating against 
the likelihood of long-term transitions and issues being monitored or taken on 
board. In Darfur, one of the gaps has been hydrogeological analysis, which partly 
explains the absence of groundwater monitoring until 2007 despite the context 
of water scarcity. Instead, there have been high levels of attention to issues such 
as community management of water projects, indicative of a bias toward social 
concerns within international humanitarian agencies, which seems to have 
occurred at the expense of some important technical skills.
Fifth, and as a consequence of all the above, the international humanitarian 
system has not been good at identifying or addressing the externalities associated 
with its programming. Humanitarian organizations have, for example, generally 
failed to consider how the provision of shelter materials (plastic sheeting that 
requires wood to support it) and the presence of so many aid agencies and staff 
have fueled a construction boom that has had a devastating impact on Darfur’s 
forest resources.
The consequences of this needs-oriented and short-term approach to 
humanitarian assistance have been particularly serious in Darfur because of 
the fragility of the balance between natural resources and human activity. As 
soon as one shifts sight from the immediate needs to Darfur’s long-term future, 
it becomes apparent that fundamental changes are taking place that must be 
addressed with long-term strategies. In the words of an experienced Darfuri 
environmentalist, “If we don’t respond to environmental degradation now, there 
will be no environment for Darfur’s future.”17
Some of these limitations of the prevailing humanitarian paradigm have 
long been recognized, especially in relation to chronic and protracted crises like 
Darfur’s. For over a decade, the linking of relief, rehabilitation, and development 
has been widely debated, usually focusing on the somewhat artifi cial distinctions 
between these three different types of programming, whether they can be carried 
out consecutively or concurrently, and how to ease the transition from one phase 
to another.18
16 Moves to disaggregate sector or cluster coordination from agency program implemen-
tation (as in the water, sanitation, and hygiene sector) are to be applauded. However, 
more could have been done to ensure that detailed contextual analysis and appropriate 
consultation fed into the development of sector strategy.
17 Personal communication with authors.
18 For an overview of the debate, see Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005).
Preparing for peace: An analysis of Darfur, Sudan  177
Clearly, environmentally insensitive programming can undermine livelihoods 
by destroying natural resources. Less visible are the ways in which the provision 
of humanitarian assistance can support or hinder relationships between different 
ethnic and livelihood groups, especially in a context as politically charged as 
Darfur’s. Such programming can affect how groups work together—such as 
whether they have positive or negative impacts on traditional processes for 
managing natural resources. For example, the international humanitarian com-
munity has been slow to engage with pastoralist abbala (camel herding) groups, 
which have tended to be demonized as members of the Janjaweed, although 
research has revealed high levels of vulnerability within the abbala communities 
(Young et al. 2009). The partiality of the international humanitarian community 
in ignoring this group has been challenged, pointing out how it has further 
marginalized a group that is key to eventually fi nding a peaceful resolution to 
Darfur’s confl ict.
On the more positive side, some agencies such as CARE and the Danish 
Refugee Council have worked with great sensitivity to bring together different 
livelihood and ethnic groups (see box). These are examples of how humanitarian 
assistance can be provided to meet short-term needs while at the same time 
building collaboration between livelihood groups that is essential for Darfur’s 
ability to adapt to the impacts of population growth, changing settlement patterns, 
and confl ict. And in 2010, the United Nations provided greater strategic leader-
ship in Beyond Emergency Relief—a publication that identifi es long-term trends 
and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur (UN 2010).
Peacebuilding by CARE International*
CARE International developed an approach to integrate peacebuilding into its rural 
programming that produced impressive results in the Kass area in the northwestern corner 
of South Darfur State. CARE formed village development committees (VDCs) comprising 
members of confl icting communities in an area. When these committees were established, 
the interaction between committee members facilitated a locally owned process of rein-
vigorating local peace committees, many of which predated the confl ict, and on which the 
same delegates often sat. Two features of the approach were particularly striking: First, 
the VDCs often took more than a year to form before substantive programming could be 
implemented through them (but this investment was part of the peacebuilding process). 
Second, CARE did not try to work directly with the locally owned peace committees until 
the VDCs were formed, at which point training was provided for the peace committees. 
The success of this approach became evident when peace committees in neighboring areas 
started to meet, creating collective fora for dialogue. In confl ict-affected situations where 
relationships of trust have been destroyed, the trust that nongovernmental organizations 
develop with and between local communities is important social capital that can lay the 
foundation for commencing the work of brokering agreements and rebuilding social fabric. 
These steps also help to rebuild mechanisms for natural resource management and confl ict 
prevention in the future.
* See UNEP (2008c).
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PREPARING FOR PEACE: LEARNING FROM RECENT 
EXPERIENCE IN DARFUR AND SOUTHERN SUDAN
Ending the confl ict in Darfur and laying the groundwork for the region’s develop-
ment is an imposing task. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to forge 
peace. It is important to understand why they failed and how an agreement might 
succeed. The agreement that ended the north-south confl ict in Sudan, after many 
years of negotiation and failures, provides some guidelines that could apply in 
Darfur. Several years of experience in Darfur also has implications for the human-
itarian organizations there—specifi cally the challenge to transition from emergency 
relief to programming that supports secure and sustainable livelihoods.
Attempts to build peace in Darfur
There have been a number of international attempts to end the violence and forge 
a peace agreement in Darfur. The fi rst serious attempt took place in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in May 2006, with the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
by the Government of National Unity and the largest of the three major rebel 
movements at the time (Minni Minnawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Army). 
However, the fact that two key rebel movements (Abdel Wahid’s faction of 
the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement) were not 
signatories exacerbated the confl ict in Darfur in the following months. There was 
no peace, and the rebel movements subsequently fractured and multiplied. In 
2007, the United Nations and the African Union launched another attempt at 
peace negotiations in Sirte, Libya, but the turnout was poor and the negotiations 
were aborted. More recently, the second Darfur peace agreement, known as the 
Doha Agreement, was signed in July 2011 between the government of Sudan 
and the Liberation and Justice Movement, but is struggling to make a difference 
at the time of writing.
Forging a workable peace agreement is a high-risk activity; several common 
factors have undermined the success of the peace efforts in Darfur. First, efforts 
have tended to be top-down approaches and have focused principally on the 
international and national levels, with much less engagement at the local level.19 
Yet, the confl ict in Darfur has to be understood in terms of the interactions 
between the international, national, and local levels.
Second, efforts to reach a peace agreement in Darfur appeared at times to 
have been driven more by international political agendas—for example, the need 
in Washington, D.C., or London to deliver a peace agreement—rather than one 
that refl ects the reality on the ground. This was the case for the DPA in 2006, 
which was characterized as “deadline diplomacy” (Nathan 2006, 5). Building 
the foundations for peace at the local level is a slow and painstaking business 
in Darfur, involving traditional leaders as well as new leaders who have emerged 
19 See UNEP (2014a).
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during the confl ict (UNEP 2014a). Instead, efforts have been mostly directed at 
the high-profi le political leaders of different movements and factions.
Third, one of the shortcomings of the 2006 DPA was its failure to address 
the land issues that are at the heart of the confl ict—including land tenure, graz-
ing, and water rights—as well as issues of local governance. By simply reaffi rming 
land rights associated with the hakura, land that was originally allocated to 
particular clans or tribal groups by the colonial authorities, the DPA unhelpfully 
reasserted the pre-confl ict status quo and failed to address one of the major 
sources of confl ict at the local level—the tensions between those with hakura 
and those without. After the signing of the DPA, in 2006, these issues were 
passed onto the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process (DDDC), 
set up by the DPA and intended to give Darfuris a voice in the peace and 
reconciliation process. The DDDC has indeed consulted on land issues within 
Darfur, but there has been little progress toward resolution.20 There has been a 
tendency in Sudan to set up processes for addressing land issues as part of the 
peace agreement, but it is now clear that these issues must be central to the peace 
negotiations themselves, and clearly addressed in the ensuing agreement (Egemi 
2006). Although it is sometimes claimed that including land and other natural 
resource issues in the peace process slows it down and risks the political interests 
of the dominant negotiating partners, Sudan’s experience shows that deferring 
these issues can result in protracted confl ict.21
Learning from peacebuilding in southern Sudan
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 
ended the North-South civil war in Sudan that had lasted for two decades. 
Although it was a fragile agreement and came under threat on a number of 
occasions, it was a remarkable achievement after previous attempts to end the 
confl ict had failed. One of the hallmarks of the process that culminated in 
the signing of the CPA was its iterative approach. Before the eventual signing 
of the CPA in January 2005, several intermediate steps occurred: the signing of 
the Declaration of Principles proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (prepared in 1994 and signed in 1997); the Machakos Protocol in 
2002, which established the overall six-year framework for the CPA; and six 
further protocols in 2003 and 2004 on issues such as wealth sharing and the 
resolution of the Abyei confl ict.22 Thus, a six-year road map was developed that 
20 The fact that the DDDC was associated with the DPA also meant that rebel movements 
that are nonsignatories to the DPA have not engaged. Thus the DDDC’s consultation 
has been partial, not comprehensive.
21 For a discussion on incorporating natural resource issues in peace processes and 
resulting peace agreements, see Marcia A. Dawes, “Considerations for Determining 
When to Include Natural Resources in Peace Agreements Ending Internal Armed 
Confl icts,” in this book.
22 For a discussion of Sudan’s North-South peace process, see Salman (2013).
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included a census, elections, and the referendum on secession in January 2011 
that led to the creation of the new state of South Sudan in July 2011. This 
extended approach contrasts starkly with the deadline diplomacy repeatedly 
applied to Darfur.
One of the failings of the CPA, however, was the fact that it was not politi-
cally comprehensive. Although it proposed a political solution to power sharing 
and wealth sharing between the North and South, it did not address political 
representation and power sharing for other peripheral regions of Sudan such as 
Darfur and the eastern states. It was not a coincidence that the Darfur insurgency 
erupted when signing of the CPA was imminent (ICG 2004).
Similarly, the CPA deliberately did not resolve land issues, even though––as 
in Darfur––land issues were at the root of the confl ict in many areas, including 
the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Instead, these were to be addressed 
in the post-agreement phase, as with the DPA. Four land commissions were to 
be set up: nationally, for southern Sudan, South Kordofan State, and Blue Nile 
State, respectively (Egemi 2006). Implementation was dangerously slow. Eight 
years after the CPA was signed, land commissions had still not been established 
in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, nor was the national land com-
mission operational, although land disputes were rife and increasingly tense.
The experience of urbanization in southern Sudan since the signing of the 
CPA is relevant to Darfur. Processes of urbanization that began during the civil 
war through displacement accelerated when peace was restored, but with little 
planning or preparedness. This put great pressure on land, services, and the 
economy. Dealing successfully with these pressures is critical for sustaining peace 
(Pantuliano et al. 2008).
Southern Sudan (and now South Sudan, especially during 2014), as well as 
other places in Sudan, provide a reminder of how outbreaks of violence and 
confl ict can continue even after a peace agreement has been signed, and of the 
region’s high levels of vulnerability to natural disasters such as fl oods and drought.
The implications for Darfur
What do the DPA and CPA imply for current and future attempts to build peace 
in Darfur? There are three key implications.
First, the peace process must be a well-informed and iterative approach. 
Much ground still has to be covered before meaningful negotiations can take 
place, not least some of the rebel movements must fi nd a way of working toward 
a common agenda.
Second, developing a vision of a “new Darfur” that can emerge from years of 
violent and bitter confl ict must be part of this iterative process, and it must take 
account of how the human geography of Darfur has changed during the confl ict 
and how it is likely to continue to change once a durable peace is secured––that 
is, with a much more urbanized population requiring a more urbanized economy 
(Buchanan-Smith and McElhinney 2011).
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Third, land and environmental governance issues that are at the heart of the 
confl ict must take center stage in the negotiations, not be relegated to the post–
peace agreement phase that carries a high risk of continuous deferment and 
resurgence of violence. This requires both technical work to develop and trial 
new forms of environmental governance with line ministries and communities, 
and political dialogue to review and endorse new forms of governance through 
negotiation (UNEP 2014b). Key issues to be addressed include:
• Clarifying the roles of the state, native administration, and the new political 
leadership that is emerging through the confl ict, to create a functional form 
of local governance that is rooted in and accountable to local communities.
• Developing the principles for a workable and equitable system of land tenure that 
takes account of both customary land tenure (favored by ethnic groups that 
already have allocated land) and statutory land tenure systems, yet addressing the 
contradictions between the two, which the DPA failed to achieve (Tubiana 2007).
• Demarcating pastoralist migration routes, taking account of competing access 
to land by pastoralists and farmers, and putting in place a peaceful dispute 
resolution mechanism.
Addressing these three issues must be done through a consultative process involving 
key stakeholders, which was missing in the DPA (Egemi 2006). The results will set 
the foundation for future environmental governance in Darfur, which must be 
appropriate to a more urbanized settlement pattern that ensures the sustainable use 
of natural resources such as water and forest resources around urban areas. Environ -
mental governance must also be suffi ciently robust to withstand acute pressure and 
competing demands on natural resources in rural areas during drought years in 
Darfur, and provide a framework for addressing long-term environmental and 
livelihood issues associated with climate change. This is a tall order, and it will 
take time to achieve. The careful and painstaking processes that underpin tradi-
tional confl ict resolution in Darfur are salutary in this respect (UNEP 2014a).
But the short-term costs of delaying resolution until these issues have been 
resolved will pay off in the long term by addressing some of the root causes of 
the confl ict and thus increasing the chance of achieving peaceful and equitable 
environmental governance in Darfur that promotes the sustainable management 
of natural resources. The experience of the failed DPA with its false urgency to 
meet deadline diplomacy is testimony to this conclusion, as is the experience 
after the CPA, when unresolved land issues continued to fester in both northern 
and southern Sudan.
Implications for international organizations: A new approach to 
humanitarian programming in Darfur
At the time of writing, the prospect of peace in Darfur is still a long way off. 
There is not even a clear road map to guide the kind of iterative process proposed 
182  Governance, natural resources, and post-confl ict peacebuilding
above. The reality is that the confl ict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur are likely 
to continue for some time to come, requiring ongoing interventions from both 
national and international humanitarian agencies. This is the reality with which 
the international community must come to terms. Frustrated by the lack of progress 
toward peace on the political front, donor governments are growing weary of 
funding continued humanitarian programming. The government of Sudan is 
impatient to see IDPs return home. But until the confl ict is resolved at all levels 
(and in particular disputed land issues), security in many rural areas is unlikely 
to improve, meaning that large-scale voluntary return for the majority of IDPs 
is highly unlikely.
Neither long-term humanitarian programming nor short-term emergency 
interventions should prevail as the central paradigm. Instead, there must be a 
dual approach to humanitarian action that responds simultaneously to short-term 
emergency needs and works toward a longer-term planning horizon and engages 
with the transitions taking place in society (UN 2010). It is only by including 
the transitions and carrying out long-term planning that humanitarian action can 
contribute to laying the foundations for peace and recovery. The reason for 
continuing to call it humanitarian action is to draw attention to the importance 
of implementing programs according to humanitarian principles. The term human-
itarian should not be equated with short-term responses; it should be defi ned by 
principle rather than time frame. The principles of impartiality and independence 
are particularly important to ensure that humanitarian programming engages with 
the needs of all vulnerable groups and that vulnerability is understood within a 
longer perspective, as Helen Young and her colleagues have urged in relation to 
pastoralist communities (Young et al. 2009). This requires the humanitarian 
community to do several things:
• Sharpen its contextual analysis. It is striking that so few humanitarian agen-
cies invest in this sort of wider analysis. These analyses should form the basis 
for a more nuanced, evidence-based strategic response. For example, there 
needs to be better take-up of the recommendations made in analytical work 
such as that of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, as well as research 
undertaken by organizations such as Tufts University, UNEP, the Overseas 
Development Institute, and Tearfund. This broader view can be supported by 
strengthening institutional memory so that new international staff are aware 
of research and analyses undertaken by their predecessors.
• Strengthen strategic programming that includes both near-term and long-term 
planning horizons. Analysis of long-term trends should have a profound impact 
on programming. Darfur is facing rapid population growth and increased 
urbanization, which in turn demand a new vision of economic development; 
it is also facing transition in the face of climate change. The impact of these 
trends needs to be built into the design of humanitarian programs concurrently 
with efforts to address short-term life-saving needs. For example, livelihood 
support to reduce vulnerability during confl ict should also facilitate adaptation 
Preparing for peace: An analysis of Darfur, Sudan  183
to climate change over an extended period. This is a challenging but critical 
agenda that demands planning and coordination skills that take into account 
longer time frames.
• Pay more attention in humanitarian programming to the PIPs that affect 
livelihoods, rather than focusing predominantly on assets (and hence relief 
distribution). This also requires different kinds of analytical and planning 
skills, especially strategic leadership.
If these three steps are taken, it is much more likely that humanitarian 
programming will address long-term livelihood issues that set the foundation for 
Darfur’s future. For example, support to livelihoods in urban areas could focus 
on adding value to Darfur’s agricultural and livestock products through process-
ing, thus developing a livelihood strategy that is an alternative to the unsustainable 
exploitation of natural resources such as timber.23 For instance, fi nding ways of 
processing perishable fruit that is transported from the Jebel Marra area (Darfur’s 
main source of fruit and vegetables) to Nyala, one of Darfur’s major markets, 
could create employment opportunities for IDPs and the urban poor in Nyala, 
thus supporting an industry with a long-term peacetime potential (Buchanan-Smith 
and Fadul 2008). If the three steps outlined above are taken, it is much more 
likely that environmental considerations will be incorporated into humanitarian 
programming—in other words, that externalities will be identifi ed and addressed, 
using UNEP’s proposed approach to (UNEP 2009, 2012):
1. Contextualize the intervention. Environmental impacts are highly context 
specifi c. An umbrella assessment can provide guidance for individual 
projects.24
2. Assess programs for potential negative environmental impacts.
3. Mitigate those impacts by modifying the program design, or compensating 
for negative impacts.
4. Enhance environmental benefi ts by extending the mitigation measures to 
bring net positive benefi ts, and extending components of the work that benefi t 
the environment.
Such an approach does not mean that relief distribution of food aid 
and shelter materials should stop. As long as the confl ict continues, they will be 
needed both to meet immediate emergency needs as waves of displacement 
23 For more information on adding value to natural resource extraction in confl ict-affected 
countries, see Matthew Wilburn King, Marco Antonio González Pastora, Mauricio 
Castro Salazar, and Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, “Environmental Governance and 
Peacebuilding in Post-Confl ict Central America: Lessons from the Central American 
Commission for Environment and Development,” in this book.
24 For an appropriate model of an umbrella assessment that balances accessibility to 
nontechnical readers with adequate environmental analysis, see Tearfund (2007a). This 
model enabled a signifi cant change in practice for implementing organizations.
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continue and to serve as long-term support for those who are unable to pursue 
their pre-confl ict livelihood strategies. But it does encourage different kinds of 
programming—for example, support to government technical departments that 
are struggling to respond to changes in Darfur’s human geography. A case in 
point is the Urban Water Corporation in towns with swollen populations such as 
Nyala, El Fasher, and Geneina.25
This approach also encourages environmentally sustainable ways of providing 
humanitarian assistance, such as using stabilized soil blocks in building rather 
than fi red bricks (fi ring bricks contributes substantially to deforestation, which 
is devastating in the semiarid region). And it encourages humanitarian agencies 
to engage with natural resource issues. If they do, during the confl ict they can 
sow and nurture the seeds that will contribute to sustainable and equitable man-
agement of natural resources in the future.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of Darfur’s confl ict is not unique. Competition over natural 
resources is rarely the sole explanation for a confl ict. Whether competing access 
to land and water results in violence has a lot to do with the prevailing political 
and institutional context, and above all with the nature and effectiveness of the 
governance structures in place to mediate competing demands. Darfur is a 
reminder of how confl icts have to be understood as multidimensional and occur-
ring at different but interrelated levels: local, national, and international.
It is also rare that a confl ict-related humanitarian crisis is short-lived. 
Experiences in many countries in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere show that confl ict 
is more likely to become protracted, as Darfur’s has become. This raises the 
important question of what can be done on the ground during confl ict to prepare 
for a sustainable peace. This question is often avoided, particularly by the inter-
national humanitarian community, which tends to focus on meeting immediate 
needs in their short planning and programming horizons. But fundamental long-
term processes can be both triggered and accelerated by the confl ict itself. In 
Darfur, these processes include accelerated environmental degradation around 
the main towns, and the extraordinary transition that is taking place in settlement 
patterns as all Darfur’s states experience rapid and distorted urbanization.
Experiences from other regions that have been subjected to prolonged confl ict 
indicate that these processes are unlikely to be reversed when peace arrives. The 
challenge for the international humanitarian community is to learn how both to 
25 Although some international humanitarian agencies have been reluctant to engage 
with government ministries for fear of compromising their principles or undermining 
their independence, it is interesting to note that the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the international agency that is probably the most rigorous and consistent 
in its adherence to humanitarian principles, has been one of the few that has engaged 
with the state water corporations in Darfur (Collinson, Buchanan-Smith, and Elhawary 
2009).
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address these processes and transitions during the crisis and to support the 
development of a shared vision for the post-confl ict future. To do so requires 
that the dominant humanitarian paradigm takes a dual approach that engages 
with both short-term and long-term planning horizons, guided by humanitarian 
principles in both endeavours. This in turn requires a shift in culture, in planning, 
and in funding timescales to ensure that humanitarian action can better contribute 
to laying the foundations for peace and recovery.
One of Darfur’s most critical needs as it adapts to the processes of popula-
tion growth, urbanization, climate change, and confl ict is in its endeavour to 
create sustainable and equitable forms of environmental governance. This 
will be essential to Darfur’s future and should be part of any peace agreement. 
Steps can be taken now to address this need—for example, through humanitarian 
programming that works with all sides in the confl ict and pays attention to 
local management and governance mechanisms. But it also implies a more itera-
tive approach to the negotiations that will eventually deliver a successful peace 
agreement, drawing on the experience of negotiating the CPA that ended the 
North-South civil war, but also learning from the gaps in the CPA, particularly 
relating to land and other natural resource management issues that have been 
at the heart of both the confl ict in Darfur and the North-South civil war (with 
South Sudan).
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